Supreme Court Rules Schools May Limit Girls’ Sports Teams to Biological Females
Supreme Court Rules Schools May Limit Girls’ Sports Teams to Biological Females
In a 6–3 decision delivered today, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that public schools may restrict girls’ and women’s athletic teams to biological females, delivering a landmark decision in one of the most closely watched civil-rights cases of the term. The ruling, in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (No. 24-43) upheld laws in West Virginia and Idaho which bar biological males from competing on female sports teams. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett.
The Court’s opinion addressed two central questions: whether Title IX permits sex-separated sports teams defined by biological sex, and whether such classifications violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
On Title IX, the majority held the term “sex” refers to biological sex—not “gender identity.” The Court concluded separate teams are “reasonable” given inherent physical differences between males and females and are justified by safety and competitive-fairness concerns. The majority rejected arguments schools must carve out exceptions for biological males who have taken puberty blockers or hormones, and declined to extend Bostock v. Clayton County’s Title VII reasoning to the sports context.
On the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, requiring the sex-based classification be substantially related to an important government objective, and found both West Virginia and Idaho met that standard. Citing United States v. Skrmetti (2025), the majority held safety and competitive fairness are important interests, restricting women’s teams to biological females is substantially related to those interests, and states need not conduct individualized assessments of each athlete’s physical capabilities.
Justice Kavanaugh opened the majority opinion by describing Title IX’s transformative effect on women’s athletics, noting girls’ high-school participation grew from roughly 300,000 in 1971–72 to approximately 3.5 million today, with an additional 235,000 women competing in college. He emphasized “enduring” biological differences in height, weight, strength, speed, and endurance, and warned judicially managed individualized exemptions would be an “almost impossible task” and a “judicial quagmire.” Notably, the opinion expressly declined to decide whether schools may voluntarily allow transgender athletes to compete on girls’ teams—a question the Court noted is being litigated elsewhere.
Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue transgender status is not a suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny, characterizing gender dysphoria as a mutable mental state subject to psychiatric treatment and distinguishing it from immutable characteristics such as race and sex.
Justice Gorsuch concurred to explain why Bostock v. Clayton County actually supports the result. He noted Bostock interpreted “sex” in Title VII as biological sex, and because Title IX expressly anticipates single-sex facilities and sports teams, sponsoring a female-only team is not unlawful discrimination.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the principal dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The dissent concurred in part, agreeing that B.P.J.’s Title IX claim fails, but sharply dissented on the equal-protection analysis. Justice Sotomayor argued the majority applied “a form of heightened scrutiny divorced from this Court’s cases,” effectively lowering the state’s burden for sex-based classifications. Relying on precedents like United States v. Virginia and Sessions v. Morales-Santana, she contended an overbroad categorical exclusion fails intermediate scrutiny when a narrower exception would not undermine the state’s interests. The dissent asserted B.P.J. was an 11-year-old transgender girl who simply wanted to run on her school’s cross-country team, and when West Virginia enacted its ban, no transgender athlete had participated in school sports in the state. Justice Sotomayor characterized the majority’s approach as resolving the case “unencumbered by fact or law,” using “contorted logic” and offering a “diminished view of equal protection.” She argued the Court should have affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s remand for further factfinding on whether transgender girls who never underwent male puberty retain any physical advantage.
The dissent also criticized the majority for citing extra-record evidence—including a study published after oral argument—and for giving legislatures effectively conclusive deference despite ongoing scientific uncertainty. Justice Sotomayor noted some studies relied upon in Idaho’s legislative findings had been subsequently altered or disavowed by their own authors.
Justice Jackson joined Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in full but wrote additionally on the Title IX question. While acknowledging B.P.J.’s concession that “sex” means sex assigned at birth, Justice Jackson argued the Court should have merely assumed, rather than held, Title IX protects only against “biological sex” discrimination. She contended Bostock plainly applies to Title IX and the the law’s use of “sex” may encompass “sex stereotyping” and “gender identity.”
The decision reversed and remanded cases from both the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. With over half of U.S. states having enacted similar laws in the past six years, and organizations including the International Olympic Committee, U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee, and NCAA adopting comparable eligibility rules, the ruling is expected to have far-reaching implications for school athletics nationwide.
